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NOTES
CREDIT CARD ACCOUNTABILITY,
RESPONSIBILITY AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF
2009: PROTECTING YOUNG CONSUMERS OR
IMPINGING ON THEIR FINANCIAL
FREEDOM?
INTRODUCTION
There are an estimated 1.22 billion credit cards in the United States.1
The average adult has about five credit cards.2 This increased use of credit
has led to substantial debt and an increase in bankruptcy filings across the
nation.3 College students are not immune to this trend.4 Although reports
vary on the number of college students with credit cards, students are a well
known market for credit card issuers.5 According to a 2001 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) Report, almost “two-thirds of all college
students had at least one credit card . . . .”6 In fact, of the nearly 9.9 million
students currently enrolled at four-year colleges, each has an average of 2.8
cards.7 Estimates of credit card debt upon graduation range from $2,2008 to
1. Press Release, Wisconsin Public Interest Research Group, Sen. Kohl et al., WISPIRG
Advocate Student Credit Card Reform Proposals (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.wispirg.org/newsreleases/consumer-protection/consumer-protection-news/sen.-kohl-reps.-hintz-and-hixson-wispirg
-advocate-student-credit-card-reform-proposals (citing CardTrack.com) [hereinafter WISPIRG].
2. U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP EDUC. FUND, THE CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP:
A SURVEY OF COLLEGE STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARD MARKETING 1 (Mar. 2008), available at
http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/x-3Q-0RsKNbZtwOKzK1-dA/AZ-Campus-CreditCard-Trap-Report.pdf (citing THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS ON THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
(July 2007)) [hereinafter CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP].
3. Wayne Jekot, Note, Over the Limit: The Case for Increased Regulation of Credit Cards for
College Students, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 109, 113–14 (2005).
4. In the time between initially writing this note and its subsequent publication, Regina L.
Hinson published Credit Card Reform Goes to College in the North Carolina Banking Institute.
Regina L. Hinson, Note, Credit Card Reform Goes to College, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 287
(2010). While both notes discuss flaws in the Act, the theses and approaches to the material differ
in salient ways. Hinson addresses, among other things, the Act’s failure to regulate underage
consumers’ spending habits (such as maximum credit limit and number of cards issued) and
discusses how earlier versions of the Act would have required underage consumers to attend a
financial literacy course prior to obtaining a credit card. Id. at 303–08. This note, rather, focuses
on the general lack of protections for student data, discusses the impact on the rights of young
consumers in depth, and suggests potential alternatives for dealing with the underlying issues
facing young consumers. See infra Part III–IV.
5. Jekot, supra note 4, at 112–13.
6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-773, CONSUMER FINANCE: COLLEGE
STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARDS 17 (June 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d01773.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
7. College Credit Card Statistics, U.C.M.S.COM, http://www.ucms.com/college-credit-cardstatistics.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2010) (listing statistics on college marketing).
8. WISPIRG, supra note 1.
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$4,100.9 It is no wonder that credit solicitors aggressively target this market.
As Senator Tom Carper (D-DE) stated, “[t]hey wallpaper all of those
college hallways with credit cards because if you can get someone at that
age to start using credit cards with your company, then you have got them
for a long period of time.”10 In fact, more than 70% of students keep their
first credit card.11 This provides a powerful incentive for the credit card
industry.
There have been several attempts by colleges and universities,12 state
attorneys general,13 and state legislators to address this issue.14 However,
only recently did Congress pass reform legislation that targets credit card
marketing on college campuses and offers protections for students. The
Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009
(Credit CARD Act or the Act)15 was intended as general credit reform
legislation geared toward assisting those in debt and stopping abusive
tactics of the credit card industry.16 The Act also specifically addresses
young consumers. In Title III, the Act places a number of restrictions on
extending credit to consumers under twenty-one, limits the ability of credit
card issuers to solicit students, and adds protections for students from
prescreened offers.17 The Act also places heavy disclosure requirements on
institutions of higher education.18
This note argues that Title III is a huge step toward protecting young
consumers and reigning in the credit card industry. The Act puts an end to a
number of coercive and deceptive practices of credit issuers19 while
pressuring universities to be more open and forthcoming regarding their

9. Anne Flaherty, Credit Reform Means New Era for College Students, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 21, 2009, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2009/may/21/us-congresscredit-cards-052109/?education; Joshua Heckathorn, Credit CARD Act of 2009 Restricts Credit
for Students, BROKEGRADSTUDENT.COM (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.brokegradstudent.com/
credit-card-act-of-2009-restricts-credit-for-students.
10. Connie Prater & Tyler Metzger, A Guide to the Credit CARD Act of 2009,
CREDITCARDS.COM (July 30, 2009), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-cardlaw-interactive-1282.php (follow “Youth and credit” hyperlink; then follow “Under-21 college
students” hyperlink) (quoting Senator Tom Carper).
11. College Credit Card Statistics, supra note 7.
12. Jonathan D. Glater, Extra Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, at B1.
13. CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 10.
14. Creola Johnson, Maxed Out College Students: A Call to Limit Credit Card Solicitations on
College Campuses, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 255 (2004).
15. Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
16. See Ben Rooney, Credit Card Relief: Phase one: The First Part of Obama’s Crackdown
on the Credit Card Industry Will Give Consumers More Notice When Contracts are Changed and
the Option to Reject Rate Increases, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 20, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/
2009/08/19/news/economy/credit_card_reform/?postversion=2009082004.
17. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1637(c), (p), (r), 1650(f), 1681b(c)(1)(B) (West 2010).
18. Id. § 1650(f).
19. See id. §§ 1637(p), 1650(f).
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participation in the problem.20 However, this note will assert that Title III
also creates several legal and policy problems in how it restricts young
consumers and how alternative solutions may have provided more efficient
and impactful ways of addressing the underlying problems.
Part I of this note provides a brief overview of the marketing, soliciting,
and lending practices of credit card companies on college campuses, the
ramifications of student credit card debt, past attempts at reform, and the
movement that led to the passing of the Credit CARD Act. Part II breaks
down Title III of the Act and examines the rules and protections placed on
young consumers and the institutions of higher education that they attend.
Part III discusses the legal and policy ramifications of the Act, arguing that
Title III severely curtails the financial autonomy of eighteen- to twenty-oneyear-olds, and falls short in protecting students from coercive marketing
practices. Finally, Part IV suggests that the Act fails to solve the
documented problems, and proposes alternative solutions that might better
address the underlying issues.
I. THE PROBLEM OF SOLICITING AND MARKETING
PRACTICES BY CREDIT ISSUERS ON U.S. CAMPUSES
Credit issuers flood college students with brochures, applications,
advertisements, and freebies.21 As a result, 56% of students have their first
card at age eighteen.22 By their final year, 91% have at least one credit card
and 56% carry four or more cards.23 Credit issuers set up tables on
campuses and outside school events in order to sell their products.24 This
practice is so rampant that 76% of students have reported stopping at such
tables to consider applying for credit cards.25 Most of the time students are
enticed to stop at these tables by the offer of free gifts.26 The gifts are
conditioned, however, on applications for cards.27 Once the cards are in the
20. See id. §§ 1637(r), 1650(f).
21. CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 2–4.
22. Jessica Dickler, Credit Card Debt on Campus: Unprepared Students Have Been
Increasingly Targeted by Card Issuers, and Some Lawmakers are Taking Notice,
CNNMONEY.COM, July 14, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/10/pf/credit_cards_college/?
postversion=2008071413 (citing data from Nellie Mae).
23. Id.
24. Lucy Lazarony, Marketing Plastic to Students Causes Lawmakers, Educators to Melt
Down, BANKRATE.COM (June 21, 1999), http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/cc/19990621.asp.
25. CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 3.
26. Id. at 3–4.
27. Id. Of the 76% of students who stop, 31% report being offered a free gift. Most common
gifts are t-shirts (50%), other (40%), frisbee or sports toy (20%), and mug or water bottle (18%).
The “other” was most commonly food. Id.; see also Amy Johannas, College Bound: Marketers
Welcome, But Credit Card Companies Get a Warning Signal, PROMO (Aug. 1, 2008, 12:00 PM),
http://promomagazine.com/eventmarketing/0801-companies-college-campaigns.
‘There is just this kind of crazy marketing atmosphere on campuses,’ [says Christine
Lindstrom, the higher education program director for U.S. PIRG]. ‘It’s pretty easy
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hands of the students, the issuers continually increase interest rates and
employ high penalties, exacerbating the consequences of the original
misguided judgment.28
The scene that awaits students is not a product of chance, nor is it solely
due to credit issuers’ initiative. Indeed, universities have a stake in these
exchanges and actively facilitate the marketers’ access to their students.29
Universities have multimillion-dollar deals with credit card companies.30
For example, “Michigan State [University] had a seven-year, $8.4 million
contract with Bank of America during which MSU gave the bank
information on students, alumni, sports ticket holders and employees.”31 In
addition, many universities have affinity card agreements that allow the
credit issuer to use the university’s name to market its cards.32 In exchange,
the university receives a share of the profits from new accounts.33 This
incentivizes the university to entice and indebt students with credit cards.34
Some, however, see the agreements between universities and credit card
issuers as a win-win situation.35 Banks get ideal marketing opportunities,
students get help paying the bills, and universities get an additional revenue
source.36

when facing [a gift of] free pizza for a student to say, ‘Oh, I’ll just go ahead and get the
card.’ That is a big problem.’
Id.

28. See WISPIRG, supra note 1.
29. Glater, supra note 12.
30. Flaherty, supra note 9. Bank of America is one of the biggest credit card issuers on college
campuses. Glater, supra note 12. As of January 2009, the bank has agreements with about 700
colleges and alumni associations. Id.
31. Susan Tompor, Credit Cards to be Curbed at Colleges, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 27,
2009, http://www.freep.com/article/20090827/COL07/908270447/Credit-cards-to-be-curbed-atcolleges. Michigan State University even stands to receive additional money if the students who
sign up carry a balance. Glater, supra note 12. According to the New York Times, Michigan State
University gets “$3 for every card whose holder pays an annual fee, and a payment of a half
percent of the amount of all retail purchases using the cards,” and “$3 if the holder has a balance
at the end of the 12th month after opening an account.” Id. Additionally, the “alumni association
of the University of Michigan is guaranteed $25.5 million” in exchange for “lists of names and
addresses of students, faculty, alumni and holders of season tickets to athletic events” over an 11
year agreement with Bank of America. Id.
32. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
33. E.g., Tompor, supra note 31. The profit from these contacts with credit issuers is so
important to many universities that they have fought legislative reform. See, e.g., Joseph Kenny,
College Fights to Preserve Student Credit Card Marketing, JSNET.ORG (Apr. 10, 2009),
http://www.jsnet.org/news-article/college-fights-to-preserve-student-credit-card-marketing
(describing Ohio State University’s fight against legislation that would limit their agreements with
credit issuers).
34. See Ben Protess & Jeannette Neumann, As Student Credit Card Debt Rises, Banks Quietly
Reward Schools, HUFFINGTON POST INVESTIGATIVE FUND (June 8, 2010, 8:01 AM),
http://huffpostfund.org/stories/2010/06/student-credit-card-debt-rises-banks-quietly-rewardschools.
35. See Glater, supra note 12.
36. Id.
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There are several reasons why the university campus is an ideal
marketing setting for banks and credit card companies. First, most students
are first time credit card users, making them a fresh market.37 Second, they
constitute an isolated and easily identifiable market.38 Most college students
live on or commute to a campus.39 Third, because they are relatively new
consumers, they are more likely to be naïve to the practices of the credit
card industry.40 Most students realize that they must build their credit
because it will be a useful tool for future purchases.41 At the same time,
they may not be educated in the nuances of how credit works.42 For
example, a student may realize that he must pay the credit card company
every month but may not understand what an annual percentage rate (APR)
is or how it will affect his balance.43 Credit card issuers rely on this naiveté
when they raise interest rates to increase their profits. Lastly, many
students, like other consumers, keep and continue to use their first credit
card.44 These factors lead to heavy soliciting of, and marketing to, college
students on or near campuses.45
This heavy marketing is demonstrated by the twenty-five to fifty credit
card solicitations students receive per semester.46 The solicitations take
various forms, including tabling at school events, direct mail solicitations,
and brochures in a variety of campus locations.47 A study conducted by the
U.S. Public Interest Research Group reported that 80% of respondent
students had received mail solicitations from credit card issuers and 22%
“reported receiving an average of nearly four (3.6) [solicitation] phone calls
per month . . . .”48
In a 2005 report, Ohio State University’s Creola Johnson described the
scene set by credit card companies that awaits incoming freshmen as “a
‘carnival atmosphere’ of blaring music and free food . . . with glossy
promotional brochures and loaded with free T-shirts, Frisbees and other

37.
38.
39.
40.

Dickler, supra note 22.
See CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 1.
Id.
See Laurie A. Lucas, Integrative Social Contracts Theory: Ethical Implications of
Marketing Credit Cards to U.S. College Students, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 413, 414–16, 422–24 (2001).
41. CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 1.
42. Lucas, supra note 40, at 414–16.
43. See generally Basic Facts About Credit Card Rates: Key Information Every Cardholder
Should Know, BANK OF AMERICA, http://learn.bankofamerica.com/articles/managing-credit/
basic-facts-about-credit-card-rates.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2010) (describing the complexities
in applying APR rates to credit card balances).
44. See CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 7 (detailing how credit card companies
compete for college students to become their “first-in-the-wallet, top-of-the-wallet” card).
45. See id. at 2–4.
46. College Credit Card Statistics, supra note 7.
47. CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 2–4.
48. Id. at 4.
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gifts to lure students into applying for credit cards.”49 Johnson goes on to
explain that, “[c]ompany representatives do not talk about the interest rates
or fees associated with the cards. Presumably, that information is contained
in the brochures. Instead, the credit card vendors emphasize the free items
and an easy way to buy clothes and books or pay for spring break
vacations.”50
These practices have contributed to a documented increase in student
credit card debt and financial management problems.51 Many critics also
cite excessive credit lines for those who do not necessarily qualify as an
additional source of the problem.52 Although introductory credit limits may
be low, they can quickly rise to $2,000 or $4,000.53
In response, some universities are starting to rethink their policies and
agreements with credit issuers.54 In recent years, there has been a big push
from students and public advocates who oppose such aggressive marketing
techniques on college campuses.55 Some universities have banned or greatly
restricted the practice of soliciting on campus altogether56 while others have
limited its scope and frequency.57
Along with the push for change from within the university, some state
legislators are stepping in and trying to set limits on these practices.
However, while statistics vary on the number of states with legislation
specifically restricting marketing on campus, the number remains generally
low.58 Texas, California, New York, and Oklahoma are among the few
49. Martin Merzer, Student Credit Card Issuers Losing Their Welcome on Campus:
Relationship Between Banks, Colleges is Complex, CREDITCARDS.COM (Dec. 8, 2008),
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/student-credit-card-issuers-losing-welcome-oncampus-1279.php.
50. Id.
51. See SALLIE MAE, HOW UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS USE CREDIT CARDS: SALLIE MAE’S
NATIONAL STUDY OF USAGE RATES AND TRENDS 2009, at 3 (Apr. 2009), available at
http://www.salliemae.com/NR/rdonlyres/0BD600F1-9377-46EA-AB1F-6061FC763246/10744/
SLMCreditCardUsageStudy41309FINAL2.pdf [hereinafter SALLIE MAE STUDY]; see also Jekot,
supra note 3, at 113–14; Johnson, supra note 14, at 206–19.
52. See, e.g., Tompor, supra note 31 (citing as an example a student who was given $25,000
even though he did not have a full-time job).
53. Jeanne Sahadi, Dad, Will You Pay My Visa?; That’s One Question Facing Parents of
College Students Who’ve Racked Up Credit Card Debt, CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 12, 2002,
http://money.cnn.com/2002/12/10/commentary/everyday/sahadi (citing Robert Manning during
his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs).
54. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 25–29.
55. See generally id. at 27–29.
56. Id. at 25–27.
57. Id.; Johnson, supra note 14, at 195–96. For example, Ball State University, whose alumni
association had a contract with a credit issuer, does not give out student information to marketers.
Glater, supra note 12. Likewise, University of Oregon has a similar policy. Id.
58. Editorial, The College Credit Card Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, at A22 (“A halfdozen states have placed restrictions on how credit cards can be marketed at public colleges.”);
Jon Chavez, Card Firms Lure Students; Experts Urge Crackdown, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 14,
2007,
http://toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071014/BUSINESS04/71013025
(“About 15 states restrict or ban credit-card marketing to students on campus . . . .”); see also
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states that have passed such laws.59 For example, the California law, passed
in 2007, prohibits the exchange of gifts for applications.60 The New York
statute (part of New York’s Education Law) is much broader.61 It prohibits
marketing altogether, except as allowed by university policy.62 The law also
makes suggestions for fair policies that schools could adopt.63
In addition to these state legislative reforms, several attorneys general
have tried to initiate reform in credit marketing to college students. Several
have opened investigations into the practices of credit card issuers on
campuses.64 For example, in 2008, former New York Attorney General
Andrew Cuomo investigated whether credit card marketers had offered
money to universities in exchange for access and information on students.65
Likewise, the Ohio Attorney General sued Citibank, a credit card marketing
company, and a sandwich shop over their alleged deceptive marketing to
college students.66
On the federal level, there have been a number of congressional
attempts to add protections for college students wishing to obtain credit.67
For example, the Consumer Credit Card Protection Amendments of 1999
(CCCPA) was introduced in the Senate and in the House of Representatives

Tyler Metzger, Campus Credit Card Regulation Brewing . . . Again, CREDITCARDS.COM (Feb. 3,
2009), http://blogs.creditcards.com/2009/02/campus-credit-card-regulation-brewing.php (detailing
proposed New Jersey bill).
59. Merzer, supra note 49. Maryland also passed legislation which “requires higher education
institutions to develop practices regarding credit card marketing and the use of free gifts on
campus.” Johannas, supra note 27. If the universities allow these practices, they must also provide
additional educational credit information. Id. Another example is Tennessee, where state
legislators passed a law that prohibits credit issuers from using student organizations or facilities
in order to recruit applicants. Id. They are, however, allowed to do so at athletic events, but are
banned from giving gifts in exchange for applications. Id.
60. College Student Credit Protection Act of 2007, Ch. 679, 2007 Cal. Stat. 262; Ashley
Geren, Credit Card Death: Students Might Want to Think Twice Before Getting a Credit Card,
THEROUNDUPNEWS.COM (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.therounduponline.net/features/credit-carddeath-1.1878895.
61. See N.Y. EDUC. § 6437 (McKinney 2010).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 10.
65. Id.
66. Id. The Ohio Attorney General sued Citibank, Elite Marketing, and Potbelly Sandwiches
for “‘unfair and deceptive’ marketing practices.” Johannas, supra note 27. The Attorney General
alleged that “students visited local restaurants for free food, only to find out they had to apply for
a credit card to receive it.” Id. The case has been partially settled. Id. As part of the settlement,
Potbelly agreed to give out coupons for its products as an incentive to get students to watch a
documentary on the credit industry. Id.
67. See Student Credit Card Protection Act of 2007, S. 1925, 110th Cong. (2007); College
Student Credit Card Protection Act, H.R. 1208, 109th Cong. (2005); Credit Card Accountability
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2004, S. 2755, 108th Cong. (2004); College Student Credit
Card Protection Act, H.R. 184, 107th Cong. (2001); Credit Card Protection Amendments of 1999,
S. 787, 106th Cong. (1999); Consumer Credit Card Protection Amendments of 1999, H.R. 900,
106th Cong. (1999).
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in April and May of 1999, respectively.68 Like the Credit CARD Act of
2009, the CCCPA contained a provision mandating a consumer under
twenty-one have a parent or guardian co-signer or to have an independent
means of repaying their credit card debt.69
Despite several attempts in both the House and Senate, including the
CCCPA, credit reform for college students had not passed into law.70
However, things in Washington changed with the 2008 election.71 President
Obama made consumer protection a part of his campaign.72 Amid a climate
of foreclosures and high debt, Obama pushed for reform in several
industries, including the credit card sector.73 In the White House press
release announcing the Credit CARD Act, President Obama tied the new
law into his larger economic recovery plans.74 With the turbulent changes in
the economy, the shift in Washington, and new support for major credit
reform, the Credit CARD Act survived the legislative process and passed
into law.75
II. PROTECTIONS PROVIDED BY THE CREDIT CARD ACT
In January 2009, Representative Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY)
introduced H.R. 627, which would later form the basis for the Credit CARD
Act.76 H.R. 627 was intended to amend the Truth in Lending Act77 and the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FRCA)78 in order to “establish fair and
transparent practices relating to the extension of credit under an open end

68. Todd Starr Palmer, Mary Beth Pinto & Diane H. Parente, College Students’ Credit Card
Debt and the Role of Parental Involvement: Implications for Public Policy, 20 J. PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING 105, 106 (Spring 2001).
69. H. R. 900 § 7; S. 787 § 7; 15 U.S.C.A. 1637(c) (West 2010).
70. Kimberly Gartner & Elizabeth Schiltz, What’s Your Score? Educating College Students
About Credit Card Debt, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 401, 408–09 (2005); see also Johnson,
supra note 14, at 254–56.
71. See Philip Elliott, Obama Signs Law Curbing Surprise Credit Card Fees, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 22, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/22/obama-signs-lawcurbing-s_n_206944.html.
72. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Reforms to Protect American Credit Card
Holders (May 22, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-Reforms-toProtect-American-Credit-Card-Holders [hereinafter White House Press Release].
73. See Elliott, supra note 71.
74. See White House Press Release, supra note 72 (“‘With this new law, consumers will have
the strong and reliable protections they deserve. We will continue to press for reform that is built
on transparency, accountability, and mutual responsibility—values fundamental to the new
foundation we seek to build for our economy.’”).
75. See id.
76. Bill Summary & Status: 111th Congress (2009-2010): H.R. 627: All Congressional
Actions with Amendments, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d111:HR00627:@@@S (listing Rep. Maloney as the sponsor of the bill H.R. 627 that
ultimately became the Credit CARD Act).
77. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006).
78. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006).
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consumer credit plan, and for other purposes.”79 It became public law on
May 22, 2009 when President Obama, in a Rose Garden ceremony, signed
the bill.80 The Act covers general consumer protection, enhanced consumer
disclosures, protection of young consumers, gift cards, and other
miscellaneous items.81
Title III of the Act is devoted exclusively to protecting young
consumers and is broken down into five sections. The first section of Title
III amends the Truth in Lending Act by limiting the “extension of credit to
underage consumers.”82 Section 301 prohibits the issuance of a credit card
or open end credit plan to a consumer under the age twenty-one83 unless the
application for that consumer contains a signature of a co-signer84 or
financial information indicating means of repayment.85 According to the
Act, the co-signer can be a “parent, legal guardian, spouse, or any other
individual” twenty-one-years-of-age or older.86 The co-signer must have the
“means to repay the debts” of the consumer and will be considered jointly
liable for that debt.87 However, the co-signer is only liable for the debt
incurred before the consumer has reached the age of twenty-one.88
Alternatively, absent a viable co-signer, a credit card applicant under the
age of twenty-one may demonstrate an “independent means of repaying any
obligation arising from the proposed extension of credit . . . .”89 The text
does not give much explanation as to what “means” would qualify under
this provision. It only requires that the consumer submit such financial
information through the application or otherwise.90
Section 301(C) tasks the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (the Board) with issuing regulations outlining the standards required
to satisfy subparagraph (B)(ii).91 The Board usually issues clarifications on

79.
80.
81.
82.

Credit CARD Act of 2009, H.R. 627, 111th Cong. (2009).
Elliott, supra note 71.
Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009).
15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(c) (West 2010) (implying that the use of the word “underage” applies
to consumers under the age of twenty-one).
83. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(A).
84. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B)(i).
85. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B)(ii).
86. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B)(i).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B)(ii).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(C). The regulations, over 800 pages, detail what credit card issuers must
do to grant or extend credit to all consumers covered under the Act. Connie Prater, Fed: Want a
Credit Card? Prove You Can Pay the Bill, CREDITCARDS.COM (Sept. 30, 2009),
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-act-fed-income-rules-1282.php.
The
regulations also clarify several vague terms in the provisions dealing with young consumers,
including “prohibited inducements,” “near campus,” “independent means of paying,” and cosigner requirements. Jay MacDonald, Fed: Credit Card Issuers, Stay Far Away From College
Campus: Stay At Least 1,000 Feet Away, New Regulations State, CREDITCARDS.COM (Sept. 30,
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the terms of a newly issued law,92 and it did so on September 28, 2009,
providing examples of the type of information that would qualify as proof
of an independent means of repaying.93 This included “expected salary,
wages, bonus pay, tips and commissions” for any type of employment,
“interest or dividends, retirement benefits, public assistance, alimony, child
support, or separate maintenance payments,” or “savings accounts or
investments that the consumer can or will be able to use.”94 These
provisions likely limit the number of college students under age twenty-one
who could qualify.95 It is unclear, however, how strictly credit issuers must
adhere to this “proof” standard.96
The Act further provides that even once a student has been issued a
credit card, the co-signer, if jointly liable for a consumer under twenty-one,
must approve any increase to the credit line for that consumer.97 By
amending § 127 of the Truth in Lending Act,98 § 303 of the Credit CARD
Act restricts young consumers beyond the application process.99 It places an
additional hurdle for eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds to obtain and
manage their credit by requiring that the co-signer approve the credit
increase.
To stem the flow of solicitations on college campuses, Congress
included protections from prescreened offers as well as restrictions on the
distribution of promotional items. Title III, § 302 amends § 604(c)(1)(B) of
the FRCA100 to include restrictions on prescreened credit offers to
consumers under twenty-one.101 This section provides that credit reporting
agencies can furnish credit reports for offers of credit only if the consumer
is over twenty-one or has consented to the disclosure.102 In other words,
except for eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds who have consented to the

2009), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/student-credit-card-rules-1279.php. This is
discussed infra Part III.
92. MacDonald, supra note 91.
93. Truth in Lending Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 54,125, 54,313 (Oct. 21, 2009) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
94. Id.
95. See generally Prater, supra note 91. See also Brian Burnsed, New Rules Place Barriers
Between Students, Credit Card Issuers, US NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 19, 2010,
http://www.usnews.com/articles/education/best-colleges/2010/02/19/new-rules-place-barriersbetween-students-credit-card-issuers.html.
96. See generally MacDonald, supra note 91 (explaining the Federal Reserve’s clarifications
but noting the failure to clarify certain aspects of the Act); see also Prater, supra note 91 (failing
to specify what reasonable policy or procedure might entail).
97. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(p) (West 2010).
98. Truth in Lending Act § 127, 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c) (2006).
99. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(p).
100. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B) (2006).
101. 15 U.S.C.A § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(2)(iv) (West 2010).
102. Id.
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disclosure of their credit report for offers of credit, the automatic flood of
mailings that bombard college freshman should theoretically start to ebb.103
The Act also adds protection from solicitations by proscribing physical
inducements in exchange for applications.104 Section 304(f)(2) prohibits
creditors from offering “tangible item[s]” to college students in exchange
for a credit card application.105 However, this prohibition is limited to offers
made on or near campus or at a school-sponsored event.106 In its
clarifications of the Act, the Board gave examples of what types of
inducements would be prohibited.107 The Act proscribes the use of tangible
items, such as a “gift card, a T-shirt, or magazine subscription” in exchange
for filled applications, but does not prohibit “non-physical items” like
“discounts, reward points, or promotional credit terms.”108 Not only is the
type of item an important distinguishing factor in determining the legality
of a practice, but the agreement must indeed be a quid pro quo.109 If the
items are given out freely regardless of whether applications are in fact
being filled out, then it would seem the Act does not apply.110
The Board’s regulations also specify that “near campus” is defined as
“within 1,000 feet of the border of the campus of an institution of higher
education . . . .”111 The borders should be determined by the institution.112
The prohibition against promotions near campus also extends to related
events, including any event in which the institution’s name or logo is used
in connection with the event so as to imply the institution’s sponsorship.113
In this way, § 304 potentially covers an expansive area on or near campus.
Besides the limitations specifically outlined in § 304, Congress also
recommends that institutions of higher education adopt their own policies to
help monitor and limit credit card marketing.114 It recommends that these
institutions instruct credit issuers to notify them of the locations where
marketing of credit cards will occur.115 Section 304 also recommends that
schools limit the number of locations for marketing116 and offer debt
counseling and education to new students.117

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B); see also Heckathorn, supra note 9.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1650(f)(2) (West 2010).
Id.
Id.
MacDonald, supra note 91.
Truth in Lending Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 54,123, 54,127 (Oct. 21, 2009) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
109. See id. at 54,328.
110. MacDonald, supra note 91.
111. Truth in Lending Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 54,328; MacDonald, supra note 91.
112. Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. at 54,328; MacDonald, supra note 91.
113. Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. at 54,328; MacDonald, supra note 91.
114. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1650(f)(3) (West 2010).
115. Id. § 1650(f)(3)(A).
116. Id. § 1650(f)(3)(B).
117. Id. § 1650(f)(3)(C).
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The final protection Title III provides is required disclosure of the
contracts between universities and creditors.118 Institutions of higher
education must “publicly disclose any contract or other agreement made
with a card issuer or creditor for the purpose of marketing a credit card.”119
Likewise, the Act mandates reporting by each creditor who has any
“business, marketing, and promotional agreements and college affinity
card120 agreements with an institution of higher education.”121 The report
must include the terms and conditions of any agreements between creditors
and universities, including memoranda of understanding, amounts of
payments between them, and the number of accounts covered by the
agreement.122 Once creditors have submitted the reports to the Board, the
Board will review them and submit an annual report to Congress and the
public.123 Additionally, from time to time the Comptroller General of the
United States is to review the Board’s reports, determine the impact of
creditor agreements, and write a report recommending any needed action.124
The passage of Title III is a tacit recognition of the need to protect
young consumers against the aggressive and deceptive practices of credit
issuers. The Act finally puts an end to the exchange of gifts for
applications.125 Prohibiting tangible inducements will limit the ability of
marketers to get the attention of college students.126 In turn, only those truly
interested in obtaining a credit card will likely approach a promotional
table. Furthermore, the Act protects students from insidious pre-screened
offers with which they are consistently bombarded.127
118. Id. §§ 1650(f)(1), 1637(r)(2)(A).
119. Id. § 1650(f)(1).
120. The Act defines college affinity card as a:
[C]redit card issued by a credit card issuer under an open end consumer credit plan in
conjunction with an agreement between the issuer and an institution of higher
education, or an alumni organization or foundation affiliated with or related to such
institution, under which such cards are issued to college students who have an affinity
with the institution, organization and—
(i) the creditor has agreed to donate a portion of the proceeds of the credit
card to the institution . . . ;
(ii) the creditor has agreed to offer discounted terms to the consumer; or
(iii) the credit card bears the name, emblem, mascot, or logo of such
institution . . . or other words, pictures, or symbols readily identifies with
such institution, organization, or foundation.
Id. § 1637(r)(1)(A).
121. Id. § 1637(r)(2)(A).
122. Id. § 1637(r)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).
123. Id. § 1637(r)(3).
124. Id. § 1637(r)(3)(B)(1)–(2).
125. Id. § 1650(f)(2).
126. See generally CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 13 (proposing “prohibit[ing]
use of gifts in marketing on campus” as part of “fair campus credit card marketing principles”).
127. 15 U.S.C.A. 1681b(c)(1)(B) (West 2010).
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Finally, forcing the universities to disclose their contracts with credit
issuers will provide a new level of transparency and accountability. Most
students are unaware of the benefits the university is gaining through credit
marketing on campus.128 With every application and subsequent account,
the university usually makes a profit.129 These deals may stipulate when and
how marketing can be done, provide unlimited access to student registration
data, or even allow for use of the university name in connection with the
credit cards.130 Exposing the agreements will not only increase public
awareness about these practices but may also deter the more unconscionable
aspects of these agreements.131
Although the Act has the potential to provide significant protection for
young consumers, it also implicates several legal and policy issues. The Act
discriminates on the basis of age by imposing additional requirements on
consumers under twenty-one132 and disproportionately impacts specific
segments of the young adult population.133 The Act also does not go far
enough in protecting students from solicitations on campus134 and fails to
solve the underlying problems that originally created the need for reform.135
III. LEGAL AND POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ACT
A. RIGHTS OF YOUNG CONSUMERS
Title III of the Act creates different contractual standards for consumers
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one.136 Placing additional
restrictions on this specific age group is both discriminatory and
ineffective.137 In addition, the all-inclusive restrictions freeze out many
young consumers who would benefit from a credit card and are capable of
handling credit responsibly but who cannot meet the heightened
standards.138 Lastly, the restrictions disproportionately affect lower income
students as well as eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old non-students.139

128.
129.
130.
131.

See Glater, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Ylan Q. Mui, Credit Reforms Reach Campuses, WASH. POST., Aug. 27, 2010, at
A14 (describing some of the contracts between credit card issuers and universities and the hope
that the contract disclosure requirement will increase transparency); Protess & Neumann, supra
note 34 (describing the millions of dollars and secrecy surrounding agreements between
universities and credit card companies).
132. See Palmer et al., supra note 68 (discussing similar objections to a bill introduced in 1999).
133. See infra Part III.A.
134. See infra Part III.B.
135. See infra Part IV.
136. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1637(c)(8), 1637(p) (West 2010).
137. See discussion infra Part III.
138. See discussion infra Part III.
139. See discussion infra Part III.
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Young consumers are a vital and important part of the economic
marketplace.140 They often lead the way in consumer trends and shape
certain markets.141 Although most people enter the marketplace at a young
age under the purchases of their parents, once they reach the age of
majority—eighteen in most states142—they can be considered financially
independent consumers.143 At the age of majority, consumers gain the right
to enter into binding economic contracts, along with the right to vote and
join the military without parental consent.144 Parents’ legal duty of support
ends when offspring reach this age, as does parental authority.145 Although
many parents may continue to support their children, they are not legally
required to do so.146
Although a child under eighteen may enter into a contract, the child
retains the right to disaffirm any contract before she reaches the age of
majority.147 The right of disaffirmance is meant to protect children from
careless financial decisions and reduce the incentive for adults to enter into
contracts with children.148 At the age of majority, however, young adults
lose this right and are bound by their contractual obligations.149 Because
they are responsible for their contractual agreements, young adults at the
age of majority should therefore be given full control over their contractual
decisions.150
Despite the full responsibility young adults assume for their contractual
obligations, Title III of the Act places limitations on their ability to enter
into contractual agreements with credit card companies.151 These limits are

140. “Teenagers spend billions of dollars annually on clothing, video games, CD players,
stereos, and cars.” ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND THE
STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 675 (Wolters Kluwer 6th ed.
2009) (citation omitted).
141. See id.
142. LAUREN KROHN ARNEST, CHILDREN, YOUNG ADULTS, AND THE LAW: A DICTIONARY
199–200 (1998).
143. See generally id.
144. See generally ARNEST, supra note 142, at 84–85, 199; 10 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). A few
rights, such as buying alcohol, are withheld from eighteen year olds; however, these are the
exceptions rather than the rule. See James Mosher, The History of Youthful-Drinking Laws:
Implications for Public Policy, in MINIMUM-DRINKING-AGE LAWS: AN EVALUATION 26–31
(Henry Wechsler ed., 1980), reprinted in MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 140, at 682.
145. ARNEST, supra note 142, at 199.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 84–85.
148. See, e.g., McGuckian v. Carpenter, 110 A. 402 (R.I. 1920); see also ARNEST, supra note
142, at 84–85.
149. ARNEST, supra note 142, at 84–85.
150. See generally Ashley Goetz, Editorial, Credit Card Act Treats Adults as Children, MINN.
DAILY, June 9, 2009, http://www.mndaily.com/2009/06/09/credit-card-act-treats-adults-children
(“Congress is saying that college-aged people aren’t really adults yet.”).
151. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(c)(8)(B) (West 2010).
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stricter than those placed on adults over the age of twenty-one.152 Section
301(B) requires an eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old applicant without a cosigner to indicate through financial information that he or she has the ability
to repay any obligation under the account.153 In contrast, § 109 of Title I of
the Act, which applies to consumers over twenty-one, states that in order to
open an open-end consumer credit plan, the card issuer must consider “the
ability of the consumer to make the required payments under the terms of
such account.”154 Section 109 provides a much easier standard to qualify for
a credit card than § 304. First, it only applies to open-end consumer credit
plans, rather than any credit card application.155 Second, the issuer must
only consider the consumer’s ability to make required payments, as
compared to requiring an ability to repay any obligation.156 In other words,
under § 109, the card issuer must consider only whether the consumer over
twenty-one is able to make minimum monthly payments, while § 304
requires that the consumer under twenty-one be able to repay any debt
incurred. The tougher standards for consumers eighteen- to twenty-one
years old discriminate against this group solely on the basis of their age.157
Despite the fact that eighteen-year-olds are considered adults and bound by
their contractual obligations, the Act treats them as a separate and distinct
group—different from children but not yet having full financial rights.
The arguably arbitrary restrictions on eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds
also freeze out many young adult consumers who want and would benefit
from credit. In an attempt to protect young consumers, Congress has
“limited the ability of their more responsible peers to build up credit
histories they’ll need when they graduate.”158 It is wise for many young
consumers to build such histories. Credit reports are being used more and
more for a variety of purposes including renting apartments, loan rates, job

152. Compare id. § 1665e (describing the requirements necessary for individuals over twentyone years of age to qualify for credit cards), with id. § 1637(c)(8)(A)–(B) (describing the
requirements necessary for those under twenty-one years of age to qualify for credit cards).
153. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B).
154. Id. § 1665e.
155. Compare id. § 1665e (applying new regulation to “open end consumer credit plans” only),
with id. § 1637(c)(8)(B) (applying restrictions to anyone who chooses “to open a credit card
account”).
156. Compare id. § 1665e (requiring credit card companies to “consider[] the ability of the
consumer to make the required payments under the terms of such account”), with id. §
1637(c)(8)(B) (applying restrictions in regards to “any obligation arising from the proposed
extension of credit in connection with the account”).
157. Consider if the Act made tougher restrictions for adults over sixty-five than for those under
sixty-five. The issue of age discrimination would be central in the debate. However, when it
comes to discrimination based on age against the young, most commentators dismiss it as
necessary and miss the inherent paternalism and prejudice. See Goetz, supra note 150.
158. William P. Barrett, College Students Face New Credit Card Cut-Off, FORBES.COM (Aug.
4, 2009, 12:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/04/credit-card-reform-bill-college-studentspersonal-finance-collegecredit.html; see also Burnsed, supra note 95.
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hiring, and insurance.159 However, many students who need and are capable
of handling credit would not qualify under the new rules. First, because the
co-signer will incur any of the obligations and suffer any damages that
result from the student’s use of the card, few students are likely to obtain a
potential co-signer other than a parent.160 Second, without co-signers, it may
be difficult for young consumers who actually need and will use credit
cards responsibly to provide enough documentation to demonstrate that
they are financially stable, even to issuers who require the bare minimum.161
“Many—especially college students and lower-income young adults—don’t
have easy access to a financially stable co-signer, [or] a full bank account . .
. .”162
Not only will these restrictions limit students’ ability to build credit
histories, but it will also hamper their ability to finance important
purchases, like books or health insurance.163 Many students are no longer
financially supported by their parents.164 They may be unable to pay for
expensive textbooks all at once, and would rather finance the purchase and
make payments over a few months.165 By restricting their ability to get
credit, the Act is especially harmful to responsible students working to put
themselves through school.166
In the same way the Act hurts responsible young adults wishing to build
their credit, it also has a disproportionate effect on lower income students.
These students may have little or no financial support from their parents.167
Likewise, they or their parents may not be able to provide proof of their
ability to repay.168 So while these lower income students may be able to
make minimum monthly payments and repay their obligation over time,
they may not be able to prove that to a credit issuer.
Another group adversely affected by the Act is non-students. Although
many sections of Title III are aimed at protecting students from aggressive
solicitations, it also has a significant impact on young non-student
consumers.169 Many young adults do not continue on to college after high
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Barrett, supra note 158.
For example, late payments will show up on their credit history. Tompor, supra note 31.
Goetz, supra note 150.
Id.
Ninety-two percent of undergraduates with credit cards report using the card for an
education related expense, such as textbooks, fees, or general school supplies. SALLIE MAE
STUDY, supra note 51, at 3.
164. Scott Jaschik, Understanding Independent Students, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 24, 2005),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/10/24/independent.
165. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 51, at 3.
166. Heckathorn, supra note 9.
167. See Jekot, supra note 3, at 126.
168. See id.
169. See Press Release, Office of Senator Chris Dodd, Senate Approves Dodd’s Bill to Protect
Consumers from Abusive Credit Card Practices (May 19, 2009), http://dodd.senate.gov/?q=
node/4968; see also White House Press Release, supra note 72; Ashley Goetz, Credit CARD Act
Impacts College Students: The Act Has Received Mixed Reactions, MINN. DAILY, June 2, 2009,
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school graduation, often opting to work or go to a vocational training
program.170 According to the National Center for Education Statistics,
compared with the sixty-three million students in elementary and secondary
school, only twenty-one million are in post-secondary degree granting
institutions.171 These eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old young adults are
especially vulnerable to the new restrictions. Often independent from their
parents and building a life of their own, they may need to make significant
purchases such as a car, furniture, insurance, or even a house.172 Obtaining
credit in order to finance such purchases and build a credit history is vital in
establishing financial independence.173 By placing heavier restrictions on
acquiring credit, the Act hampers the ability of these eighteen- to twentyone-year-olds to become fully independent adult consumers despite the fact
that they function as such in every other aspect.174
Although the Act frames the issue as one of protectionism, its
restrictions on the financial freedom of young adults is saturated with
paternalism. At a certain point, society must stop placing restrictions on the
autonomy of young adults.175 Usually this point comes at the age of
majority when children are considered legal adults, independent from their
parents and subject to the same rights and responsibilities as other adults.176
By restricting the ability of eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds to get a credit
card like any other adult, the Act merely delays full financial freedom and
tramples on the autonomy of young consumers.
The Act also only delays and does not solve the youthful misjudgments
its proponents were originally concerned about. In passing the Act, many
legislators and advocates justified the provisions with the idea that young
consumers were getting buried in debt because they did not know how to
manage and build responsible credit.177 Those young adults who now
cannot get a credit card under Title III will be no better equipped with the
skills and knowledge necessary to manage credit upon their twenty-first
birthday.178 By failing to mandate credit education or provide any additional

http://www.mndaily.com/2009/06/02/credit-card-act-impacts-college-students (noting that the Act
“has certain rules and restrictions designed to protect college-age students”).
170. Projected Number of Participants in Educational Institutions, by Level and Control of
Institution: Fall 2008, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/
programs/digest/d08/tables/dt08_001.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
171. Id.
172. See Barrett, supra note 158.
173. Id.
174. See Goetz, supra note 150.
175. See generally Gary B. Melton, Decision Making by Children: Psychological Risks and
Benefits, in CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 21–37 (Melton, Koocher, & Saks eds., 1983)
(discussing the psychological aspects of decision making by young adults); Goetz, supra note 150;
Geren, supra note 60.
176. See ARNEST, supra note 142, at 199.
177. See WISPIRG, supra note 1.
178. See generally Johnson, supra note 14, at 269–76.
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resources to teach young consumers these skills, Title III does not get to the
heart of the underlying problem.179 On the contrary, the financial
independence of young consumers is merely delayed, specific groups are
disproportionately impacted, and the autonomy of young adults is hampered
without adequately addressing the issues that form the basis of the problem.
B. NOT FAR ENOUGH: CONTRACT AGREEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS
ON MARKETING
While the Act’s limitations on marketing and its requirements of
university contract disclosures contribute to solving the problem of
predatory solicitation on college campuses, these limitations do not go far
enough. Contract disclosures will not prevent universities from providing
student data to credit card issuers.180 At the same time, the disclosures may
violate confidentiality provisions and impinge on contractual privacy.181 In
addition, Title III’s limits on marketing merely prevent the distribution of
pre-screened offers and tangible gifts,182 leaving large loopholes for
solicitors to continue to take advantage of students on campus.
Forcing universities to disclose their contracts with credit issuers183 may
have some beneficial effects. For one, it may deter universities from using
blatantly unconscionable contract provisions.184 However, it will not likely
deter universities from freely giving out student data in exchange for a
portion of the profits issuers realize from student credit accounts.185 The
sharing of student information provides creditors with the ability to target
the student market and provides the essential means for the tactics the Act is
trying to stop.186 By failing to limit student data disclosure, the Act does not
go far enough in addressing contractual agreements between universities
and credit card issuers.

179. See id.
180. See CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 9.
181. Memorandum from Bond, Schoeneck & King, Higher Education Law Information Memo:
Federal Credit CARD Act Regulates College and University Relationships with Credit Card
Issuers (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.bondschoeneckking.com/pdfinfomemos/08-2009
%20im%20higher%20ed.pdf.
182. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1650(f)l, 1681b(c)(1)(B) (West 2010).
183. Id. § 1637(r).
184. See Protess & Neumann, supra note 34 (describing provisions that allow universities to
“receive bonuses when students incur debt” and when students carry a balance from one year to
the next); see also Glater, supra note 12.
185. See Glater, supra note 12 (discussing the practice of using revenue from credit card issuers
to fund “scholarships and other programs”). In a separate survey earlier this year, USA Today
found that “two-thirds of the nation’s largest 15 universities either partner with banks to promote
debit cards or are looking to do so.” Kathy Chu, Credit Cards Go After College Students; Banks
Increase Efforts to Forge Relationships with Attractive Demographic, USA TODAY, Mar. 31,
2008, at B6.
186. See Glater, supra note 12. However, many students are unaware of this information
sharing. Id.
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The Act also insufficiently limits marketing on campus. Although it
prohibits giving out tangible items in exchange for credit card application,
the Act does not prohibit issuers from providing these gifts for free.187
Under Title III, credit card marketers are still able to give out free items to
entice students to come over to a table and speak with representatives. The
items simply cannot be conditioned on a filled out application.188 In other
words, before the Act the marketers had tables giving out free pizza in
exchange for a filled out application, and now the marketers can still have
tables with pizza and applications but just no quid pro quo exchange.189
There is no doubt that students will still be enticed by the smell of free
pizza and fall into the same traps laid by the solicitors.190 While the
elimination of the quid pro quo exchange is an important and crucial step in
reforming credit card marketing practices on college campuses, it is not
enough.
IV. THE ACT’S FLAWS PREVENT IT FROM ADDRESSING SOME
OF THE UNDERLYING ISSUES FACING YOUNG
CONSUMERS WHILE OTHER ALTERNATIVES MAY
PROVIDE MORE FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTIONS
Although the Act may bring about some important changes in the
predatory lending practices of credit card issuers on college campuses, it
does not solve some core problems. Reform that does not directly restrict
student access would likely prove a better solution.191 A combination of
stronger protections for student data, increased marketing limitations on
credit card issuers, and student credit education would inform and empower
students to take responsibility for their own finances while still protecting
them from the most deceptive and coercive practices. Protecting student
data would force universities to be more honest and accountable to their
students.192 Placing further limitations on marketing on campuses would
decrease the availability of credit cards and therefore force responsible
students to more actively seek out credit information on their own.193

187.
188.
189.
190.

See MacDonald, supra note 91.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1650(f) (West 2010).
See MacDonald, supra note 91.
See generally id. (stating that if the gift is given to students regardless of whether they fill
out an application it is not an inducement under the Act).
191. See Heckathorn, supra note 9.
192. See U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP EDUC. FUND, IMPROVING THE CREDIT CARD
ACT’S BENEFITS TO STUDENTS AND OTHER YOUNG PEOPLE: A GUIDE FOR COLLEGES AND
POLICYMAKERS 7–8 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.studentpirgs.org/uploads/
0b/3a/0b3a756061e78f775da9c1dd228bf0f4/CreditCARDACTissuebrief_Aug2010.pdf
[hereinafter PIRG GUIDE FOR COLLEGES].
193. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 267–68.
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Finally, better credit education would inform and empower students rather
than suppress their financial freedom.194
A. STRONGER PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENT DATA
Student data is already partially protected by the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).195 FERPA was enacted in order to protect
student privacy and educational records.196 It includes a general prohibition
against releasing information from a student’s educational record without
written permission.197 However, there is an exception for student directory
information198—the exact type of information institutions of higher
education provide to credit issuers.199 Further, FERPA only applies to
schools receiving Department of Education funds.200
The exception for student directory information does, however, include
the requirement that the school have an opt-out provision.201 Therefore,
schools may release student directory information but must allow students
to opt-out of the disclosure. For example, at the University of Michigan
students are generally told how they can opt-out of having their information
publicly displayed in directories or provided in response to a request.202 The
policy is not specific to credit card companies.203 However, opt-out systems
are problematic because they require an affirmative step by the individual
student before her information is protected.204 In addition to placing the
burden on the student, universities may also fail to widely publicize the
option.205 In order to truly protect student data, this FERPA exception must
be changed to require an opt-in for disclosure.
An opt-in privacy policy is one in which students would have to
expressly give permission before their information may be shared with
194. See id. at 269–77.
195. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006).
196. Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), U.S. DEPT.

OF ED.,
http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html (last modified 6/16/09).
197. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b).
198. Id.
199. See id. at 1232g(a)(5)(A) (defining “directory information” as “the student’s name,
address, telephone listing, date and place of birth, major field of study . . . .”); see also Glater,
supra note 12 (“‘Students are generally told how they can opt out of having their information
publically displayed in directories . . . .’”).
200. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(3)
201. Id. § 1232g(a)(5)(B).
202. Glater, supra note 12.
203. Id.
204. Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, Or No Options At All: The Fight For Control of
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1071–91 (1999).
205. See Glater, supra note 12 (discussing the lack of awareness by students to agreements
between universities and credit card companies); see also Eric Goldman, On My Mind: The
Privacy Hoax, FORBES.COM (Oct. 14, 2002), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/1014/042.html.
Goldman argues that the “cost-benefit ratio [of protecting privacy/information] is titled too high
for consumers.” Id. A similar argument can be made for students opt-out provisions.
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credit card marketers.206 By requiring this affirmative step, the opt-in policy
would decrease available member lists.207 In this way, opt-in regimes would
slow, if not end, direct marketing to college students by limiting the amount
of information shared with credit issuers.208
The decision between opt-out and opt-in policies comes down to who
should internalize the costs of protecting student information—the
university or the student. Universities may not want opt-in policies because
they will incur the costs when students opt-out while getting very few
benefits in return.209 When students fail to opt-in, the university has less
information to sell and therefore will receive less money in exchange for
student directories.210 They will also incur costs from disseminating opt-in
information to students, persuading them to act, and sorting through
requests received.211 Due to the low benefit and high cost to the universities,
legislation may be required in order to ensure the use of opt-in policies.212
Opt-out policies, on the other hand, are better for universities but worse
for the protection of students. They provide for some student control while
eliminating the cost of permission seeking.213 The efficiency of the opt-out
system assumes that the student has full information and can easily and
readily regain control over her personal information.214 Students often do
not receive, read, or understand the implications of university policies on
the use and sharing of their information.215 As a result, students will
internalize the costs of the information sharing.216 Opt-out policies diminish
student power and make it substantially more difficult for students to secure
their personal data.217 As a result, they provide little protection of student
information.
A default opt-in policy—or any default rule in which the individual
retains control over her information even after she provides it freely to one
206. See Sovern, supra note 204, at 1103.
207. See Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, The Impact of Opt-In Privacy Rules on Retail
Credit Markets: A Case Study of MBNA, 52 DUKE L.J. 745, 770 (2003).
208. See id.
209. Sovern, supra note 204, at 1106.
210. See id. at 1106–13.
211. See Staten & Cate, supra note 207, at 767 (discussing the costs of opt-in policies for
particular credit issuers).
212. See generally Sovern, supra note 204, at 1081–83 (discussing how businesses may adopt
opt-out systems to preempt government regulation).
213. See generally id. at 1099–1100.
214. See id.
215. See generally Goldman, supra note 205.
216. See Sovern, supra note 204, at 1106; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and
Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2076–84 (2004).
217. See Sovern, supra note 204, at 1072–78; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the
Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 49 (1997) (discussing how
information shortfalls in the health care context lead to a “monopoly equilibrium” that is
maintained through a shallow consent process that does not provide consumers with the
information they need and therefore makes it more difficult for them to retain any real control
over their data).
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entity—would provide for more protection of student data than an opt-out
system. Professor Jerry Kang points out that a default rule placing power in
the student’s hands would eliminate inefficiencies common to the contrary
approach.218 If the default rule leaves the use of students’ personal
information to the university’s discretion, a single student would face
considerable difficulties in determining what information is collected and
how it is used or distributed.219 With a default rule reserving student control
over her information, these information costs would be greatly decreased;
students would know how their information is being used because the
university would be required to seek their permission to use it.220 This type
of default rule or opt-in to university disclosure of student directory
information is necessary to protect students’ data privacy.221 Amending
FERPA to include such a rule would provide a more comprehensive
solution to the endless flow of credit offers that bombard college students
by addressing the problem at its source.222
B. STRONGER MARKETING LIMITATIONS ON CREDIT CARD ISSUERS
In order to truly address the problem of predatory solicitations on
college campuses, the loopholes in § 304 of the Act must be closed.223
Although these provisions ostensibly provide protections from some of the
more coercive marketing practices, they may be easily navigated around.224
Credit issuers will likely only have to change their behavior slightly in
order to legally continue the same practices.225
Credit issuers should be prohibited from providing free gifts on
campus. Under Title III, credit card marketers may technically still be able
to give out free items to entice students to come over and speak with
them.226 However, they cannot provide the items as a quid pro quo
exchange for a filled-out credit card application.227 Students will likely still
be unduly enticed by the offer of free gifts.228 This is a deceptive practice

218. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193,
1253–57 (1998).
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See PIRG GUIDE FOR COLLEGES, supra note 18, at 3. Some universities are already putting
these types of policies in place. See Grant McCool, NY AG Cuomo Strikes Student Credit-Card
Reform Agreement, REUTERS, Sept. 7, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE6863S020100907.
222. See PIRG GUIDE FOR COLLEGES, supra note 192, at 3.
223. See supra Part III.B.
224. See MacDonald, supra note 91 (describing the opportunity for credit card issuers to avoid
the restrictions of the Act by offering items without requiring that students apply for the card).
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1650(f) (West 2010).
228. See MacDonald, supra note 91.
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that the Act should have completely eliminated.229 Title III should have
required that only information be provided at tables.230 This would provide
a balance between allowing credit issuers access to students while
prohibiting any undue influence.231 The information would be there for
those students who wish to seek it out. This convenience will still likely
pull in many new customers for the credit issuers, but the new customers
would not have been enticed by the usual traps.232
C. CREDIT EDUCATION
With 39% of students arriving on campus with a credit card233 and 84%
of the overall student population having credit cards,234 credit education is
more important than ever. In general, college students may lack the
financial knowledge and skills necessary to successfully manage their
credit.235 This ignorance of basic credit management information makes
credit education an essential element in solving underlying credit misuse by
undergraduates.236 Financial education can be successful for many
vulnerable groups, including those new to credit.237 Using guidance from
students on how to provide the information, universities should be required
to implement programs that actively educate students on the proper and
responsible use of credit.238
More and more freshman students are carrying credit cards. A study
conducted by Sallie Mae reported a 60% increase—from the Fall of 2004 to
the Spring of 2008—in the percentage of first-year students carrying credit
cards.239 At the same time, a large percentage of these students have
reported being “surprised” by their credit balance.240 Fully 38% have at
some point expressed surprise at their credit card balance and 22% report
being frequently surprised.241 Although the feeling of “surprise” may be
attributed to a number of factors, including failure to account for all

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 13.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
Johnson, supra note 14, at 266–68.
SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 51, at 6.
Id. at 5.
Johnson, supra note 14, at 268–76.
Id. at 269; see also CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 13.
See Gartner & Schiltz, supra note 70, at 419–20 (discussing a project that brought all
stakeholders in the credit debate together for educational purposes and conducted a study that
determined that new credit users are “especially vulnerable” and “could benefit from initiatives
designed to help consumers manage credit cards successfully”).
238. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 51, at 16 (reporting that students are “interested in
pursuing some areas of education to increase financial literacy” and presenting data collected
regarding how and when students would like to receive such information).
239. Id. at 6.
240. Id. at 11.
241. Id.
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purchases or how they will add up,242 it is difficult to imagine that a student
would be frequently surprised if they completely understood the way credit
works. In fact, 84% of undergraduates admitted the need for more financial
management information.243 Credit education could be used to limit the
likelihood of surprise based on such lack of knowledge. Financial literacy
can be gained through credit education.244 Credit education provides basic
information about terms and conditions, how to avoid and manage debt, and
how interest rates and penalties work.245 Increasing awareness of credit
issues through education could influence how young consumers view and
use credit cards.246 At a time when they are being bombarded with credit
offers, credit education is particularly vital to stemming the flood of poor
credit decisions.247
Students appear to agree with this idea. In all, 84% of undergraduate
students indicated that they would like more education on financial
management.248 Many students are not receiving this information.249
Furthermore, 64% indicated that they would like to receive information in
high school and 40% as college freshman.250 In addition to providing a
positive response to the idea of credit education, the Sallie Mae study also
asked students about the best way to provide such information.251 Students
reported wanting financial management information provided in person,
preferably “in the classroom” or “through one-on-one meetings.”252 With
students willing to participate in educational programs and providing the
roadmap on how best to do it, credit education programs should be
relatively easy to implement.
In fact, many credit issuers already provide financial education to
undergraduate students.253 Likewise, some universities offer financial

242. See id.
243. Id. at 16; see also Johnson, supra note 14, 227–28 (citing 2002 survey of 401 students at
The Ohio State University that found that less than half of the freshman understood that missed
payments will negatively affect their credit).
244. See U.S. FIN. LITERACY & EDUC. COMM’N, TAKING OWNERSHIP OF THE FUTURE: THE
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR FINANCIAL LITERACY xi–xii (2006), available at
http://205.168.45.52/sites/default/files/downloads/ownership.pdf [hereinafter LITERACY STUDY].
245. Johnson, supra note 14, at 268–76; CAMPUS CREDIT CARD TRAP, supra note 2, at 13.
246. Gartner & Schiltz, supra note 70, at 423 (“[T]he results of one issuer demonstrate that
credit education works for people who are new to credit, especially college students.”); Johnson,
supra note 14, at 268–69.
247. Johnson, supra note 14, at 268–76.
248. SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 51, at 16.
249. Id. A third of respondents for the Sallie Mae study reported that they had never or rarely
discussed credit cards with their parents. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Majoring in Credit-card Debt, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20607411/ns/business-businessweekcom/.

2010]

Protecting Young Consumers

183

literacy and credit education.254 The Credit CARD Act could have taken
credit education a step further by mandating it in universities.255 In the
alternative, the Act could have required credit education only when the
university had a contract with a credit issuer.256 Either way, this would go
further in addressing the underlying dearth of knowledge that can lead to
credit mismanagement by young consumers.257 As it is, the Act’s limits on
eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds merely delay the potential problem
instead of providing the fundamental education needed to solve it.
CONCLUSION
Title III of the Credit CARD Act is a huge step toward providing better
protection for young consumers. The aggressive solicitation and marketing
practices by credit issuers on college campuses made change necessary.
Although the Act gets it right when it comes to banning the quid pro quo
exchange of tangible items, prohibiting pre-screened offers, and mandating
contract disclosures, it leaves open many loopholes and fails to address
some fundamental problems. Restricting young adult ownership of credit
cards only delays credit misuse; it does not solve it. The Act should not be
aimed at discouraging all use, but rather encouraging responsible use. A
combination of stronger protection of student data, increased marketing
limitations on credit card issuers, and credit education would create a
solution where informed and empowered students could take responsibility
for their own finances and still be protected from the most deceptive and
coercive practices.
Kathryn A. Wood

Bank of America, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, American Express, and others say they
are providing a valuable service to students and they work hard to ensure that their
credit cards are used responsibly. Citibank and JPMorgan both offer extensive financial
literacy materials for college students. Citibank, for instance, says it distributed more
than 5 million credit-education pieces to students, parents, and administrators last year
for free.
Id.

254. LITERACY STUDY, supra note 244, at 93–94 (discussing examples and the importance of
“higher education institutions . . . providing financial literacy opportunities to students”); Grant
McCool, supra note 221 (discussing N.Y. Attorney General’s negotiations with the State
University of New York System to adopt practices like financial literacy programs to educate
students, as well as an opt-in system for sharing students’ personal information with credit card
companies).
255. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1650(f) (West 2010).
256. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 268–76.
257. See generally id. at 224–27.
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